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"[Revolutions] are the consequences but never the causes of the downfall of 
political authority."  
    Hannah Arendt, 1963 
 
³$QGLQDVPXFKDVWKHUHYROXtion dominated the first year, counter-revolution, in all its 
forms, has made a comeback in the second phase. Today we are witnessing the rise of new 
forms of counter counter-revolution. Some are peaceful, others violent and if left 
unchecked, will further GHVWDELOL]HWKHUHJLRQ´ 
      Marwan Bishara, 2013 
 
As the scenario of the Arab uprisings still unfolds, I will offer some reflections on 
the manner in which efforts to engineer political change tend to stand in the way of social 
reform.  Before I venture into this analysis, I would like to introduce a proviso: not being a 
specialist on the region, I do not have the hubris of offering a standard analysis 
(conceptualization thoroughly substantiated with evidence) of the upheavals in the Arab 
world and the socio-political transformations they triggered. For the sake of academic 
honesty, yet deliberately defying the conventions of academic writing, I will disclose that 
part of my biography that serves as an experiential entry point into my analysis of the 
events in the Middle East and North Africa. This entry point is my personal participation 
in the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe ± an experience that colors 
strongly my perspective on the Arab uprisings.  
I grew up in Bulgaria, under the µROGUHJLPH¶RIVWDWHVRFLDOLVPJHQXLQHO\
committed to the values of communism, until I became disenchanted and frustrated, like 
many of my peers, with the privileges the ruling elites bestowed themselves to the 
detriment of the population, and in rampant violation of the very doctrine that legitimated 
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their rule. In my first year at the university, I joined a dissident group and became 
involved in the protests against the communist regime; I also participated in the 
organization of the student strikes that eventually triggered the downfall of the regime.  
Our outrage was against the abuse of power; our demands were for responsible rule.  We 
were, indeed, successful in triggering the downfall of the communist regime. Yet, my 
involvement in the dissident movements and student revolts left me with a sense of failure 
despite our apparent success, as the blueprint of capitalist liberal democracy, imported 
from the West, swiftly replaced the communist dictatorship. The sources of this feeling of 
failure, which arose already while the dictatorship was crumbling, were two: First, the 
dissidents, especially the young people who had sparked the revolt, were quickly pushed 
aside -- our revolution was hijacked by the old generation, just as it is happening now in 
Egypt. The second source of the disappointment was the discrepancy between our protests 
and the political order they engendered. Our grievances and our desires for change had 
very little to do with the models of Western capitalist democracies that powerful elites 
erected via formally democratic processes.2 It is this cunning betrayal of social change by 
the political process of transition that I suspect is now happening to the Arab societies in 
turmoil. 
 I am now looking at the upheaval across the Arab world with the same hopes, but 
also with the same fears, which we, the makers of the anti-communist revolutions in 
Eastern Europe had twenty years ago.3 My ambition in this chapter is therefore limited to 
the desire to reflect on some features of the Arab uprisings that resemble the trajectory of 
the revolutions in Eastern Europe, in order to highlight the fragile opportunities for 
positive change ± opportunities which I hope the peoples of the Middle East and North 
Africa would not waste, the way we let them slip in Eastern Europe a quarter of a century 
ago. 
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In what follows, I will first address the conundrums that even seemingly successful 
revolutions encounter ± the danger of erecting a desired political edifice (in the case in 
hand ± democracy) without undertaking social refRUP'UDZLQJRQP\FRQFHSWRIµFULWLFDO
SROLWLFDOMXGJPHQW¶ ± judgment that proceeds from the particulars of social grievances 
rather than from the precepts of available principles and rules,4 I will then venture to 
discern the immanent goals of the Arab uprisings ± that is, goals that emerge as a result of 
the critique of the old regime contained in the initial acts of rebellion, rather than as later 
rationalizations of the efforts for change. Finally, I will address the likelihood that the 
political system that is being put into place as a purported embodiment of the objective of 
change can effectively achieve these goals.  
The Dangers of Successful Democratization 
The Arab uprisings are now living in the critical interzone between Past and Future. 
This interzone is suspended between two types of freedom: freedom from and freedom to, 
as the German thinker Hannah Arendt named them ± the negative, cleansing moment of 
the destruction of the old order and the positive, constructive moment of the creation of 
the new one. The swift transition from the negative to the positive moment is crucial for 
the success of social uprisings, as failure to do so means falling into chaos (Libya), civil 
war (Syria), or resurrection of the old regimes under a new guise.  
However, there is a danger also contained within the happy scenario of the swift 
transition from protest to a desired new order: I will claim that even when societies 
successfully make the transition to democracy, as we see now happening in Egypt and 
Tunisia (holding elections, setting up constitutional assemblies), the dynamics of political 
success can be triggering dynamics of social failure. This is so because much depends on 
the degree to which the link between past and future (the moments of demolition and 
construction) is constituted as being an adequate translation of the initial social grievances 
(those that had triggered the rejection of the old regime) into a new political order.  Only 
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so far as the new political order emerges through policy solutions to the social suffering 
that had triggered the rejection of the old regime can the new regime claim to have 
fulfilled its historical mission.  
Why is this important? Because the manner in which the bridge from past to future 
is constructed determines whether the new order will acquire not only legality and formal 
acceptance, but also legitimacy and effective public endorsement. I have in mind here 
legitimation in sociological, rather than philosophical sense. Legitimation in the 
VRFLRORJLFDOVHQVHLV³DPDWWHURIMXVWLILFDWLRQVRIUXOHHPSLULFDOO\DYDLODEOHRQHVWKDWWKH
FLWL]HQV«DUHOLNHO\WRILQGYDOLGXQGHUWKHJLYHQKLVWRULFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´5  The new 
political order can acquire legality on two grounds: (1) because it is in substance a 
rejection of the old order ± for instance, the replacement of a monarchy with a republic or 
of a dictatorship with a democracy; (2) when the transition is undertaken according to 
valid procedures (for instance, via elections, or constitutional conventions and referenda) ± 
as we have seen happening in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.    
However, acquiring legality does not grant automatically legitimacy in the 
sociological sense I specified ± that is, citizens might not embrace the new regime as the 
desired outcome of transition. As sociological legitimacy has a strongly behavior-orienting 
effect for actors, it is a necessary condition for affecting social change beyond a political 
change.6  
Sociological legitimacy can be achieved only when the new order is an adequate 
response to the grievance that had triggered the original protest, rather than a 
rationalization of the change emerging within the subsequent ideological battles among 
actors struggling for power. Such battles are likely to substitute the original grievances 
with the interests of the constituencies they purport to represent, as well as to focus 
attention on the crafting of new political rules of engagement allowing the maximization 
of their political presence. This is exactly the risk the rebelled societies of the Arab World 
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are now facing ± that, in their rush to constitute the new political order, they fail to carry 
out social reforms even as they carry out successfully political reforms. This ultimately 
will deprive the new regimes of sociological legitimacy, as the social pathologies that had 
undermined the old regimes, if unaddressed, would be reproduced under the new ones. 
This is the error that the anti-communist revolutions in much of Eastern Europe committed 
twenty years ago. As we rushed to create the future, the issues that had triggered our 
outrage against the old regimes (abuse of power, corruption, privileges, socially 
irresponsible rule entailing poverty) were sidetracked by grand platforms of justice 
advancing democracy or capitalism as being the goals of the revolution. That is why the 
capitalist liberal democracies we built in Eastern Europe are deficient of legitimacy ± and 
they experience now a wave of popular reactions against them, even a rejection of 
democracy and nostalgia for the old regime among young people who have never lived 
under state socialism.   
The Ambitions of the Arab Revolts 
:KDWDUHWKHQWKHµLPPDQHQWJRDOV¶RIWKHsocial upheavals across the Arab 
world?  Some voices are urging, ³,VODPLVWKHVROXWLRQ´ 7, others -- that a secular regime, 
human rights, free markets, are the solution. The crucial question, however, is: The 
solution to what?  
To recognize the aim of our actions, Hannah Arendt observed, is not a matter of 
free will (say, as we chose between candidates in democratic elections). It is a matter of 
right or wrong judgment.8 In order not to squander the opportunities that social upheavals 
enable, we need to apply what I have called a critical political judgment.9 This judgment 
has three features.  
First: critical judgment does not equal a political decision (exercise of will) ± it is a 
judgment about the grounds on which power can be exercised.  Therefore, we must ask ± 
on what grounds is power given to the parties that are now being propelled to power?  
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Second: Identifying the proper grounds for the exercise of power requires keeping 
focus on the grievance that has triggered the social protest. In the turmoil of a revolution, 
as I recall, it is not clear what SHRSOH¶VDVSLUDWLRQVDUHDQGWKHVHDVSLUDWLRQVDUHRIWHQ
conflicting. However, all revolutions are triggered by a broadly shared social frustration 
RXUVZDVH[SUHVVHGLQWKHWHUPVµWKLVOLIHLVQRWQRUPDO¶7KHDLPVRIDUHYROXWLRQDUH
already latent in the protest that sparked the revolt and analyses should start there, taking 
these revolts as empirical entry points of analysis. It is important to stay focused on this 
frustration, to decode it and relate it to the construction of the new order, rather than rush 
into building the future with available blueprints ± such as democracy, human rights, or 
the scriptures of Sharia law.   
The third feature of critical political judgment is that it keeps its focus on systemic 
forms of injustice. Let me explain: Grievances of injustice come in two types. The first 
type concerns the unequal distribution of power among actors ± for instance between men 
and women, among ethnic and religious groups, between religious and secular groups, or 
between an oppressive regime DQGLWVSRSXODWLRQ7KLV,FDOOWKHµUHODWLRQDO¶GLPHQVLRQRI
injustice. However, there is another dimension of injustice, which has nothing to do with 
the oppression of one group by another, but rather with the social conditions in which 
people live ± the rules of the game to which all participants are subjected. I call this 
µV\VWHPLF¶GLPHQVLRQRILQMXVWLFH,WFRQFHUQVWKHOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVDVJHQHUDWHGE\WKH
political economy of a given society.10   
It is usually systemic injustice, related to unacceptable social conditions (and I do 
not mean simply poverty, as poverty is a matter of relational injustice), that triggers 
revolutions ± the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century targeted the replacement 
not simply the political order of parliamentary monarchism that excluded the bourgeoisie 
from power, but the replacement of the feudalistic political economy with a capitalist one. 
However, the relational aspects of the distribution of power are closer to the surface and 
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are more easily activated (for instance, the distribution of power between religious and 
secular actors or among social groups). The danger is that issues of systemic injustice are 
sidetracked as revolutions focus on relational aspect of how power is divided among the 
main actors. A symptom that this is happening in the context of the Arab uprisings is that 
public debate is now strongly marked by sectarianism ± the battle of groups for a stake in 
the distribution of power (the battle among strands of Islam, or between Islamist and 
secular groups, between new actors and incumbent elites such as the military).  The 
danger here is that, as we rush to change the political realm we might fail to change the 
fabric of society, as Hanna Arendt (1990) has aptly put it.11  
Let us now try to identify the grievance that triggered the explosion of popular 
protest across an Arab World. To recall, understanding correctly this change-initiating 
grievance is important for two reasons: (1) to articulate the proper grounds on which the 
new public authorities can exercise power; and (2) to give proper sociological legitimacy 
to the new political order, by constructing it as a response to that grievance.  
Looking at the various examples we have at hand ± Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, I would include also Morocco, what is the common denominator 
among them? Most strikingly, these were insurgencies against ferociously secular 
regimes.12 Is this why Islamist parties are rising to power? This might explain why Islamic 
parties are winning votes, but does not explain for what purposes (in the name of what 
political goals) power is given to them.   
Let us look more carefully at the spectrum of injustices in these societies. These 
societies were haunted, in various degrees, by both types of injustices: relational ± having 
to do with the oppression of religious groups by secular dictatorships, and by the 
oppression of religious and ethnic groups by a group favored by the ruling elite), as well 
as structural injustice ± having to do with the way the political economy determined the 
living conditions in these countries.  
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The primordial trigger of the uprisings, however, was a protest against degrading 
living conditions that were experienced as assault on human dignity. Let us recall that the 
explosion of protests in 2011 was triggered by the suicide of a 26-year-old Tunisian street 
vendor, a university graduate exasperated by his inability to provide for his basic 
livelihood.  The revolts were preceded by the worker protests that erupted in 2008 in 
Gafsa -- the mining centre of phosphate extraction, where an experienced worker earned 
the equivalent of 90 euro.13 The economic and social malaise that sparked the protests was 
QRWFDXVHGE\ODFNRIPRGHUQLVDWLRQµHFRQRPLFEDFNZDUGQHVV¶QRUGLGLWKDYHWRGo 
with the secular nature of the regimes. Since the 1980s, governments in the region had 
adopted liberal economic policies as prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank.14 
However, the introduction of the free market has been particularly painful in autocratic 
societies in which power and resources are already centralized and consolidated, as the 
Lebanese political philosopher Ghassan Salamé has argued. As he points out, the passage 
to a market economy in some Arab societies created even greater economic instability for 
the masses (and I stress instability, rather than poverty), however much it may have 
contributed to the overall wealth of these societies. Protests sprung from the realization 
that the passage to free market capitalism had benefitted few and generally harmed most 
citizens, as hoards of young graduates remained unemployed as a result of neoliberal 
economic policy. Let us also recall that the precedent to the 2011 uprising in Egypt were 
the worker protests in 2006 ± DJDLQVW0XEDUDN¶VH[SRUW-oriented neoliberal policies 
prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank.  
Note, however, that even in the country which so far has been most successful in 
its transition to democracy ± Tunisia, the ideological battles between Islamists and 
secularists have dominated the political arena, side-lining the social and economic issues 
that initiated the desire for change. No wonder that the street protests in Tunisia have 
continued, and grievances widened to include housing, job security, and state benefits.  
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To the extend that the protests were not a rebellion against the fierce secularism of 
the ousted regimes, we cannot assert that power is being given to the Islamic parties on 
religious grounds, for the purposes of establishing Islamic rule. What are the grounds, then, 
of the power granted to Islamic parties in the course of democratic elections?  
The language in which the grievances have been expressed is highly symptomatic 
of the nature of the uprisingV¶LPPLQHQWJRDOV15 The slogan of the Tunisian popular 
protests reaG³:RUN± Freedom ±National dignity, as well as ³*HWRXW´LQ)UHQFK'pJDJH 
addressing Ben Ali). The grievances were overwhelmingly expressed in the terms of 
violations of dignity, of karamah. However, it would be wrong to interpret directly 
violations of dignity as a matter of political oppression and therefore ± as calls for political 
freedoms. In Arab culture, karamah is essentially a social concept.16 The word 
karamah is derived from karam (generosity). In this sense, dignity is related to 
the capacity to give rather than receive, to provide and care, rather than be endowed with 
rights and privileges.17 Violations of dignity were caused particularly by the humiliation of 
crushing poverty and degradation. In contrast, calls for Al Hurriyah (non-oppression) were 
secondary, and related to the realization that the assault on dignity via degrading social 
conditions was committed by the oppressive regimes.18 In this sense, the protests targeted 
both the systemic injustice of humiliating social coQGLWLRQVDQGµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶RQRQH
hand, and the relational injustices of poverty and subordination to oppressive rulers, on the 
other.  
Here the grievances against the two forms of injustice converge to highlight the 
fundamental concern activating the uprisings ± that of the political responsibility ruling 
elites held for the conditions of the societies they governed. Importantly, in the societies of 
the Middle East and North Africa where uprisings occurred, people were not simply 
frustrated by the conditions in which they lived, but felt that the ruling political elites were 
to blame. The issue of political responsibility became associated to that of humiliating 
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social conditions.  As demographers (such as Emmanuel Todd et Youssef Courbage 2007) 
point out, attitudes of political activism targeting the responsibility of the state arise in 
societies with high literacy.19 Let us recall that among the first images of the mass protest 
in Tunisia was that of young people showing their diplomas and protesting that they 
cannot find a job despite being highly qualified. It is significant that, by contrast, the 
connection between poverty and political responsibility is not being made in Algeria and 
Morocco where the education levels are considerably lower than those in Tunisia and 
Egypt. In both Algeria and Morocco, grievances against poverty have not been linked to 
the criminal responsibility of existing regimes; thus, instead of calling the monarchy to 
DFFRXQW0RURFFDQVDUHUHO\LQJRQ.LQJ0RKDPPDG¶VJRRGZLOOwho initiated 
constitutional reforms, approved by referendum).    
Therefore, we have good grounds to claim that the original grievance triggering the 
Arab uprisings was not simply a grievance against poverty, but against irresponsible rule 
causing social injustice. The proper goal of the revolutions, therefore, is the establishment 
of responsible rule able to deliver social justice.  Is Islam the answer to this? That may 
very well be. I will come back to this point.  
Before that I would like to clarify my claim that socially responsible governance 
(the immanent goal of the Arab uprisings) does not automatically equate with political and 
economic freedom, nor does it equate with democracy.  
To explain the difference, I will draw on the work of Emmanuel Kant. In his short 
political essay The Perpetual Peace, Kant draws a distinction between the organization of 
power (forma imperii) and the way in which the state makes use of its power (forma 
regiminis). The organization of power can take three forms -- autocracy, aristocracy, or 
democracy while the style of rule is either despotic or republican.20 Kant warned against 
confusing the republican constitution with the democratic one, remarking that democracy 
is perfectly compatible with the despotic exercise of power.21 .DQW¶VLQVLJKWLQWRWKH
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superior importance of the style of exercise of power over the way power is organized22, 
directs attention to two ways in which power in a democracy (as a form of organization of 
power) can be exercised -- in a socially responsible way in contrast to simply responsive 
way.23 Democracy, as popular sovereignty, self-rule, is a form of responsive governance. 
But, as we have seen in the experience of western democracies, responsive governance 
does no always guarantee a socially responsible rule.  
The concept of responsible rule predates considerably that of democracy and the 
rule of law in the political history of Western Europe. One can find it in the Bible, where 
in the chapter Genesis of the Old Testament, we read that God gave dominion of man over 
all living creatures. This dominion is described not in the terms of rule over subjects, but 
as husbandry, as responsibility for overseeing the wellbeing of those who are in your care. 
Historically, a relationship of mutual dependence between public authority and subjects 
was established in the absolute monarchies of sixteen-century Europe ± thus, the practice 
of responsible governance preceded that of responsive governance (that came with 
democracies much later ± in the nineteenth century).24  
The later devices of rule of law and democracy consolidated responsible 
government as they also forced it to take the shape of accountable and responsive 
government. Yet, the liberal mechanisms of accountability that constrain power (such as 
the checks and balances among the branches of government), and the democratic 
PHFKDQLVPVRIPDNLQJSRZHUUHVSRQVLYHWRSHRSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHVYLDHOHFWLRQVDUHQRW
the foundations of responsible power, they are its stabilizing devices. Democratic, 
responsive, power is neither always responsible, nor always competent, as Alexis de 
Tocqueville already observed at the dawn of democratic government in Europe and 
America.  
Islam, secularism, and socially-responsible governance 
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My main point so far has been that the new governments emerging from the Arab 
uprisings would have sociological legitimacy (and thereby proper public endorsement and 
historical durability) only on condition that they deliver socially responsible governance 
that addresses the demands for social reforms (thematised as decent living conditions) ± 
concerns that sparked the social upheavals. 
Can the Islamic parties that are being propelled to power in the region through 
democratic elections deliver this? Undoubtedly. Will they deliver it? We have reasons to 
doubt that. Let me address these doubts next. Islamic parties are in principle well able to 
provide responsible governance aiming at the wellbeing of the population. Such a notion 
of responsible governance is part of the heritage of Islamic culture. Islamic literature is 
rich in injunctions about integrity in politics and the rejection of usurious speculation in 
economics; about ethical behavior, condemning cheating and corruption, as well as 
respecting the environment.25 (Tariq Ramadan and Mustafa Akyol, among other scholars, 
have written eloquently on this). The Quran spells out rights intended to protect the ruled 
IURPWKHUXOHUV0RUHRYHUWKHRULJLQDOPHDQLQJRIµXPPD¶-- which is commonly 
WUDQVODWHGDVµ0XVOLPFRPPRQZHDOWK¶± LVµFRPPXQLW\¶DQGLQWKH0HGina of the time of 
the prophet the umma comprised Muslims and non-Muslims.26 Most importantly, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has demonstrated that it has strong governance know-how. It 
effectively delivered social services at the grass roots level in Egypt under the old regime, 
doing what the government failed to do ± taking care of its population. Members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were active in the professional syndicates and trade unions, thus 
gaining a reputation for competent and responsible governance.27 
However, despite its ability to claim legitimacy based on responsible governance 
in the interests of all, the particular Islamic parties that are aspiring to power are generally 
failing to do this. The trajectories of failure are multiple. First, they are invoking historical 
and religious legitimacy (that is, either that they have been in opposition to the old regime, 
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or they stress Islam as a religion), rather than invoking the notion of responsible rule, as 
available in the Quran, and formulating corresponding social and economic policies. Most 
commonly, electoral rhetoriFKDVEHHQIROORZLQJWKHOLQH³the previous governments 
committed all kinds of abuses because they did not fear God; the Islamists fear God, 
WKHUHIRUHWKH\ZLOOEHJRRGUXOHUV´ 
Second, Islamic parties are focusing on the relational, rather than the structural 
aspects of the new order ± they are more focused on securing the strong representation of 
the population as Muslims (that is why they appeal to Sharia law), rather than creating a 
political economy that would alleviate social and economic injustice for all. This is the 
curse of sectarianism as insurrections triggered by indignation with socially irresponsible 
UXOHQRZJLYHZD\WRWKHVWUXJJOHIRUSRZHUDQGWKHTXHVWLRQµZKRJRYHUQV¶UHSODFHs the 
TXHVWLRQ´KRZGRZHZDQWWROLYH´ 
The third way in which Islamic parties are hindering the initial impulse to social 
change is by maintaining the economic policies of the old regime. It is not just corruption 
and favoritism under the old regimes that brought about humiliating social conditions, but 
QHROLEHUDOHFRQRPLFSROLF\ZKLFKXQGHU0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHEURXJKWQHDUO\DWKLUGRIDOO
Egyptians below the poverty line.28) Reportedly, Khairat-el-Shater, the multimillionaire 
businessman, deputy-chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, promotes a version of Islam 
that explicitly promotes neoliberal capitalism along the lines of private, export-oriented 
growth that Mubarak promoted. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has clumped 
down on dissent regarding economic policy.29 Hassan Malek, speaking for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 2011, declared that Mubarak's 
free-market policies were on the right track.30  
While Islamic parties are failing to deliver socially responsible rule despite being 
in principle equipped to do so, secular regimes are no less prone to the same failure, to the 
extent that they do not enact the socio-economic and political changes implied in the 
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demands of the popular uprisings. Engaging in socially responsible governance is now 
being hindered above all by the hardening of the main political divide along Islamism-
secularism lines, thus diverting attention away from socio-economic reforms, and focusing 
it instead on the issue of who holds power and the manner in which power is exercised. 
Thus, when the military-backed interim government in Egypt outlawed the Muslim 
Brotherhood ± the party with largest popular support in the county that led in elections 
over the past three years ± it considerably weakened its own sociological legitimacy, even 
as its formal legal legitimacy might be unscarred.31 Equally regrettably, the expulsion 
IURPSROLWLFVRIRQHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VROGHVWDQGODUJHVWSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQVRQJURXQGV
that it speaks for radical Islam, in fact completed the ossification of the orienting lines of a 
meaningful political divide in the country in the terms Islamism-versus-secularism.  
To recap, the political dynamics of transition from autocratic rule in the Arab 
world are beginning to betray the initial ambitions of the social upheaval in three ways: by 
continuing the economic policy that had made livelihoods increasingly precarious under 
the old regimes; by giving political relevance to Islam (allowing the impact of Sharia Law 
on the political framework of rule); and /or by mobilizing political support on sectarian 
grounds.    
The imposition of Sharia law would be wrong for several reasons: Firstly, it is the 
law accepted as valid by only a section of the population, be that the majority. Secondly, 
Sharia law, as a collection of rules for Muslims to obey, has a strongly prescriptive nature, 
thus excluding the notion of critical political judgment I referred to earlier as the tool of 
finding the right political solutions to social grievances. Third, development of the Sharia 
law has taken place in a direction away from the original inclusive rationalism of the 
Quran ± the word of God as revealed to Mohammed. This has happened, as the Islamic 
scholar Mustafa Akyol reminds us, by way of codifying into law the hadith ± sayings 
attributed to the prophet later, and whose source are the power politics and social mores of 
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a conservative, desert society, incorporating practices imported into Arab culture (such as 
the stoning of women, imported from Judaism, and the veiling and seclusion of women, 
imported from Persia and Christian Byzantium).32  
To avoid a likely misunderstanding ± my argument is not against the rule of 
Islamic parties; rather, my hope is that Islamic parties would adopt the inclusive ethos of 
responsible governance that is part of the Islamic political tradition (the collective wisdom 
encoded in the Quran) without resort to the precepts of Sharia Law.  
However, we already see that policy change is deviating from the original concern 
with the provision of social justice by responsible governments, as the question of who 
holds power trumps the question to what end is power to be exercised, what type of 
societies are to be created. This displaces the energy of the social upheavals in the wrong 
direction; it also would deprive the new governments from social legitimacy, despite their 
perfect legality.  
Paradoxically, it is democracy (parliamentary elections based on universal 
suffrage) that is the main engine now undermining social reform. First, elections are 
opening the door to the dominance of powerful economic actors, who have a vested 
interest in preserving the economic models of the old regimes.33  
Second, it is exactly the universal franchise that diverts politics away from the call 
for responsible, rather than responsive, rule and which marginalizes the young people who 
issued this call. Islamic parties are responding to the social grievance of poverty, as they 
focus their electoral discourse on the cost of food and promise better living conditions. 
The typical comments one can hear at polling stations in poorer districts is that while 
SHRSOHZDQWVWDELOLW\DQGVWURQJHFRQRP\³LWLVXOWLPDWHO\LQ*RG¶VKDQGV´34  The 
GLVFRXUVHWKDWWKHIXWXUHRIWKHFRXQWU\LVLQ*RG¶VKDQGVLVLQIUHTXHQWXVHE\,VODPLF
parties at the times of electoral mobilization ± a discourse that goes directly against the 
notion of responsible and accountable governance that ignited the uprisings. 
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There is a third way in which election-led change is side-tracking social reform ± 
this concerns the fact that, as parties are competing against each other, they mobilize 
particular constituencies; they have to draw lines, which brings sectarianism to the fore ± 
thus, dynamics start to focus on the relational dimension of change (how power is 
distributed), rather than on the structural one ± what society is to emerge from the 
revolutions.   
A more reliable mechanism of transition, I believe, are round-table talks at which 
the main actors (in the case of the Arab upheavals ± the youth movements, the 
professionals, the Islamic groups, the military where it supported the uprisings, etc.) can 
discuss what needs to be changed and how. As the American political sociologist Andrew 
Arato has observed, the normative advantage of the round table talks lies in their 
production of legitimacy. I believe this legitimacy is achieved only when the round table 
talks manage to maintain a robust link between the initial grievance that sparked the mass 
protests, and the new political order.35  
Conclusion: The Arab upheavals approaching their future 
The substitution of social change with political change, and of responsible 
governance with simply responsive rule, are the immediate dangers for the Arab uprisings. 
However, as they still inhabit the critical interzone between past and future, these societies 
still have the enviable chance to set aside available models, either borrowed from the West, 
or found in local religious doctrines, and craft a model of their own, in terms as yet 
unfamiliar. Suffices that they focus their energies on solving the social pathologies that 
sparked the uprisings, and ground the newly established public authority on the ethos of 
responsible governance that the young protesters are still demanding.   
And it is in this sense that the Arab uprisings carry an important message to the 
inhabitants of the old western democracies. If we have the courage to admit that the social 
grievances that triggered the Arab uprisings are also the injustices ruining our Western 
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societies, we will have to wake up to one unseWWOLQJTXHVWLRQ³:KHUHLVWKHUHYROWRIWKH
:HVW´" 
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